Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Knowledge: Knowledge is the awareness or understanding of something. It can be acquired through experience, or education. Knowledge can be factual, procedural, or conceptual. See also Propositional knowledge, Knowledge how.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

G.W.F. Hegel on Knowledge - Dictionary of Arguments

Gadamer I 361
Knowledge/Absolute Knowledge/Hegel/Gadamer: According to Hegel, it is (...) necessary that the path of the experience of consciousness leads to a self-knowledge that has no other, foreign, beside itself. For him, the completion of experience is the "science", the certainty of oneself in knowledge. The standard by which he thinks experience is thus that of knowing oneself. Therefore, the dialectic of experience must end with the overcoming of all experience, which is achieved in absolute knowledge, that is, in the complete identity of consciousness and object.
>Experience/Hegel
.

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Höffe I 328
Knowledge/Phenomenology/Hegel/Höffe: [at the beginning of phenomenology] is the immediate knowledge, the sensual certainty. According to its self-understanding, it has not yet omitted anything from its "object", so that it appears as the most comprehensive and "truest" knowledge. However, it is directed toward a "this" in the "now" and "here".
>Now/Hegel.
This/here/now/Hegel: This truth cannot be lost by writing it down, explains Hegel: "This here and now" can be, for example, my standing desk in my study at 9:30 a.m. (...) and so on. Consequently the truth of "this" lies in all "these", correspondingly the truth of "now" in all "now", thus not in an immediate truth that at the same time leaves nothing out, but in a contentless general.
Content/showing/(to) mean: This only gains content if you mean the thing you point to when you say "this". But this thing, (...) one is no longer directly certain of oneself, but one perceives it, with which one reaches the second level of consciousness: after the sensual certainty of this, here and now, one finds oneself on the level of the perception of a thing.
Absolute Knowledge: The consciousness gains its climax and at the same time the final stage of the experience with itself - that begun in the viewpoint of speculative philosophy - in the (...) "absolute knowledge" reached only by it. >Speculative Philosophy/Hegel, >Speculative Philosophy/Gadamer.
Dialectic/Levels: According to dialectic the different figures are not placed next to each other, but rather appear in a hierarchy, which is not brought to consciousness from outside. It results from the experiences that the consciousness makes with itself(1).
>Dialectic/Hegel, >Dialectic.

1. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27
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